The Arbitrators' Complete Award

Below, the complete transcript of the Arbitrators' award in the matter of Leeds United v The Football League.

It is reproduced herein sans commentary.

The pdf document is available at http://www.football-league.premiumtv.co.uk/staticFiles/4c/ec/0,,10794~126028,00.pdf


IN THE MATTER OF AN FA RULE K ARBITRATION BETWEEN:
(1) LEEDS UNITED 2007 LIMITED
(2) THE ROTHERHAM UNITED FOOTBALL CLUB LIMITED

(acting by its administrator) Claimants -And – THE FOOTBALL LEAGUE LIMITED Respondents THE AWARD INTRODUCTION
1. This is an Arbitration pursuant to Regulation K of The Rules of The Football Association Ltd.
2. The Parties are:

Leeds United 2007 Limited – ‘Claimant’ The Football League Limited – ‘Respondents’. The Rotherham United Football Club Limited is seeking to join in the Arbitration as a Claimant.
3. The Claimant seeks a Declaration that the imposition of 15 points deduction for the 2007-8 season in League One (L1) was unlawful, void and of no effect.

BACKGROUND
4. On 4 May 2007, the day before the last weekend of the League football season 2006/7, Leeds United (the Club) went into administration and KPMG LLP were appointed Administrators. On the same day KPMG hived down the assets of the Club to Leeds 2007
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and agreed to sell the entire issued share capital of Leeds 2007 (‘Leeds OldCo’) to a new company, Leeds United Football Club Limited (‘Leeds NewCo’).
5. When a Club goes into administration the Football League’s Articles, Regulations and Insolvency Policy are engaged. The Insolvency Policy enables the Football League to establish a degree of control over the situation. The Policy’s primary purpose is to protect the integrity of its competition and the image of the League by pursuing three basic objectives:
(1) Survival of the club in membership of the League, where possible;
(2) Satisfaction of the Football Creditors, by preventing the Club defaulting on their contractual obligations to their players even in insolvency;
(3) Protecting the interests of other creditors, giving them the opportunity to determine their own financial settlement, by requiring the approval of creditors to a formal CVA or Scheme of Arrangement, save in the most exceptional circumstances.

Thus the protection of unsecured creditors by the requirement of a CVA is very important to the public perception and credibility of the League.
6. The Administrators proposed a Company Voluntary Agreement (‘CVA’). At the Creditors meeting held on 1 June 2007 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) an unsecured creditor and the League (the Respondent) voted against the CVA. However, the meeting approved the CVA by the required majority.
7. On 3 July 2007 (the last day for the commencement of such proceedings) HMRC commenced proceedings in the Leeds District Registry of the High Court of Justice challenging the approval of the CVA. The challenge was based on the decision of the Chairman of the creditor’s meeting as to the voting rights of three creditors, Astor Investment Holdings Ltd, Mark Taylor and Co. and Yorkshire Radio Ltd (‘the Claims’).
8. Directions were given for the determination of the proceedings. The substantive hearing was fixed for hearing on 3 September 2007 for five days. The Administrators decided to bring the CVA to an end on 6 July 2007 notwithstanding the approval of the creditors for the following reasons:
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“*The listing of the trial+ was three weeks after the 2007/2008 football season commences and our expectation was that the judgment might not be handed down until late September / early October 2007 and could be subject to appeal. The challenge by HMRC meant the Club could not complete the existing CVA given the constraints of time and funding. In essence, the Administrators were not confident that sufficient funding could be generated from the sale of players to trade the Club through to a conclusion of the Court process. Therefore the Administrators concluded that embarking on such a process which would put realisations available for creditors at risk, was not appropriate.”
9. The Administrators also indicated that it would not be appropriate to propose another CVA – for reasons which are not relevant to these proceedings. On the same day (Friday) the Administrators re-offered the business of Leeds OldCo for sale on an unconditional basis with a deadline for offers and proof of funding by 5p.m. on 9 July 2007 (Monday). The reasons given for the short timescale included that a substantial offer for the business from one potential purchaser (the ‘Bates Consortium’ led by Mr Ken Bates) was due to expire by 5p.m. on 9 July 2007, and that the majority of the Leeds players had not been paid since June 2007.
10. The Administrators received a number of enquiries from potential purchasers. Four offers were received. The respective potential dividend that each offer would make available to the creditors were: Leeds United Football Club Ltd (the Claimants, i.e. the ‘Bates Consortium’) increased that offer to 52.9p (in the £); Offer ‘B’ 26.7p; Offer ‘C’ 32.3p; Offer D 15.0p.
11. KPMG in a letter stated:

“in the absence of any certainty as to whether the League would agree to the transfer of the football share without a CVA, the Administrators accepted the offer for the sale on an unconditional basis to [Leeds NewCo] of the issued share capital of [Leeds OldCo]. (Emphasis added)
12. Thus, on 11 July 2007 the contract entered into on 4 May 2007 was varied to provide for the sale to Leeds NewCo of the issued capital of Leeds OldCo on an unconditional basis.
13. The Football League was faced with a novel situation: how to protect the interests of the unsecured creditors in the absence of a CVA? The completion of a CVA is not an absolute requirement of the Football League. The Board retained the discretion to waive
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the requirement in exceptional circumstances and to fashion a situation to preserve the integrity of the competition, to protect Football Creditors, without letting down unsecured creditors. In doing so it had to be astute not to set a precedent that put the principle underlying the Insolvency Policy at risk.
14. Normally Regulation 11 requires that a new Member (i.e. Leeds NewCo) should start the following season in a lower League (here L2). Leeds NewCo wanted to avoid this ‘relegation’ and to ensure Leeds stayed in L1 it was prepared to pay a price to achieve this. The Football League was receptive to the idea and indicated that it might be prepared to exercise its discretion to permit this to happen.
15. On 27 July 2007, at an extraordinary meeting of the Board of the Football League it was decided that:
(i) Efforts should continue to achieve a CVA or equivalent to satisfy the requirements of the Football League’s Insolvency Policy; BUT
(ii) If notwithstanding those efforts, the Board should conclude that a CVA was not a feasible option, the Board would exercise its discretion to agree to a transfer of the ‘League Share’ to Leeds NewCo, so that Leeds NewCo could start the 2007-8 season in League 1, on various terms and conditions to be accepted by Leeds NewCo, including the Condition that Leeds NewCo would be deducted 15 points from the commencement of the next season.
16. On 31 July 2007 a meeting was held between representatives of the League, Leeds NewCo (Mr Shaun Harvey, Chief Executive and Mr Mark Taylor) and the Administrators of Leeds OldCo to explain the Board’s decision, including the proposed 15 point deduction. Mr Mark Taylor, a Director of the Claimant, enquired whether Leeds NewCo could make written representations to the Football League about the level of points deduction and this was agreed to.
17. Mr Nicholas Craig, the League’s in-house Solicitor, later spoke to Mr Shaun Harvey and specifically mentioned that in the absence of a CVA or other method of demonstrating the agreement of secured creditors, the League would be imposing a deduction of 15 points as a condition of the transfer of the League Share to NewCo.
18. Mr Ken Bates telephoned Lord Mawhinney expressing his surprise and concern about the idea of points deduction ‘in blunt and direct terms’. Lord Mawhinney’s response was
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that the waiver of the CVA requirement was exceptional and ‘therefore might come with strings attached’.
19. On 2 August 2007 the Administrators informed the Club that there was no prospect of the CVA proceeding and that they intended to abort the CVA and resign their positions. Mr Taylor wrote to the Football League but did not mention the points deduction nor make any representations as to why it should be varied or waived. Mr Bates rang Lord Mawhinney. We accept Lord Mawhinney’s account that Mr Bates asked that if the 15 point deduction was imposed he could appeal against it. Lord Mawhinney suggested that he would be prepared to recommend that to the Board but the appeal should be to the member clubs because it was the member clubs that the Board was supposed to be representing. Mr Bates agreed to this suggestion and Lord Mawhinney agreed to put his proposal to the Board which he did on the following day.
20. On 3 August 2007 a Board meeting was held when the 15 point deduction was confirmed and an appeal to the League was agreed to. Later that day Mr Taylor wrote to the Football League objecting to the points deduction on the basis that it was outside the powers of the Board or was an improper exercise of its discretion. However Mr Bates by telephone informed the Football League that this letter had been sent without his authority and that it should be withdrawn. Mr Taylor wrote a second letter acknowledging the receipt of the proposed Agreement (which included Clause 4) asking that his earlier letter should be disregarded and confirming that:

“the conditions set out in your letter are acceptable to *the Claimants+ save that the Company will appeal against the 15 point deduction ... with a view to the penalty being either withdrawn or reduced.” He told us that he wrote the second letter because it did not accurately reflect what had been agreed.
21. Later that day Mr Taylor signed the Agreement on behalf of the Claimants. What did he put his signature to?

THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
22. This was a carefully drafted and formal legal document (a copy is attached). The Recitals set the scene and describe the scope of the Agreement. Recitals ‘E’ and ‘F’ refer to the
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Board’s discretion. Recital ‘G’ records that the Board had agreed to facilitate a transfer under ‘Option Three’ (as distinct from ‘Option Two’, a L2 start under Regulation II),’ subject to the terms of this agreement, including the conditions (emphasis added).
23. Under the heading ‘Acknowledgement and Agreement’ Clauses 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 Leeds NewCo recognised that the requirement of a CVA was “a reasonable and proportionate requirement of the Insolvency Policy having regard to the public perception of the League, the credit worthiness if the member clubs, the credibility of the League and the integrity of the League’s competition and that no approval of the unsecured creditors had been secured.” In Clauses 1.1.3, 1.1.4 and 1.1.5 Leeds NewCo expressly confirmed the Board’s absolute discretion under Articles 4 and 6 to refuse or accept the transfer to Leeds NewCo.
24. Clause 1 concludes with Leeds NewCo acknowledging and agreeing the crucial Condition which is central to this Arbitration:

“The Board has determined that the appropriate sanction should be the imposition of a penalty points deduction of fifteen championship points in Season 2007/8 subject to an appeal to the member clubs of the League as outlined in Clause 3 below”.
25. Clause 4 is headed “Waiver of Claims” and provides as follows:

“4.1 Leeds hereby release the League, any of its directors, officers, employees and any member club of the League (past, present or future) (the “Released Parties”) from all claims, whether known or unknown to Leeds, which Leeds has or may have against the Released Parties arising out of or connected, whether directly or indirectly with the service of the Notice, the conduct of the League with regards to OldCo, the Conditions and the imposition of the sanction or, if passed, the Appeal Sanction (the “Claims”). 4.2 Except for the obligations created by this Agreement Leeds hereby covenants that it shall not, and will procure that its directors, associated companies ..., shareholders, officers or other employees shall not commence, or threaten to commence, any proceedings in any jurisdiction before any court, arbitration panel or other similar judicial body against the Released Parties (including by way of third party claims in any other action) arising out of or connected, whether directly or indirectly with any of the Claims.”
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26. Mr David Philips QC on behalf of the Claimants submitted that the Clause should be construed strictly against the League. Furthermore the Clause is invalid as its effect is to oust the jurisdiction of the Courts and therefore contrary to public policy.
27. The Tribunal is unable to understand or accede to the Claimants argument that the condition should be strictly construed against the League. No alternative more benign construction has been suggested. This was a commercial bargain, at arms length between a powerful and rich Consortium of businessmen and a responsible professional Sports Governing Body. No authority has been cited to support the proposition that special rules of interpretation apply to general release or waiver clauses.
28. The Tribunal is not persuaded that the Clause is an ouster clause. As already stated this was a commercial agreement; it contained legitimate release and waiver provisions. The Football League consists of its Member Clubs and is the Governing Body. The agreement was between an Applicant and the League in respect of a dispute between them. The compromise was reached in order to resolve the parties’ differences without resorting to the Courts. Such a negotiated settlement does not oust the jurisdiction of the Courts. Either party can seek to enforce the other party’s obligations before the Courts or by Arbitration. In short, the agreement is not a procedural bar. Contrary to the Claimants contention public policy is firmly in favour of enforcing compromises and releases in the interests of avoiding or minimising litigation.
29. Leading Counsel also contended that the resort to arbitration is simply ‘to enforce the obligations created by the Agreement’. These words merely mean that Leeds can enforce the Compromise Agreement should the League default (which it has not). They do not mean that Leeds can impugn the Agreement or its Conditions. Moreover the parties expressly provide in Clause 3.1 that:

“The Club shall have a right to appeal against the *15 point Condition] in accordance with the terms of this Clause 3, but not otherwise. (Emphasis added) We reject this contention.
30. In reaching our conclusion on the meaning and effect of this Agreement and in particular Clause 4 we have taken account of the circumstances in which the Compromise Agreement came into existence. Leeds OldCo went into administration. In accordance with its undisputed powers the League issued a Compulsory Transfer Notice
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in respect of the League Share (which entitles it to membership of the League) in the name of Leeds OldCo requiring it to transfer the League Share at par value to the Secretary of the League. Leeds NewCo wished to succeed Leeds OldCo as owner of Leeds United FC, by becoming a Member Club and securing a transfer of the League share to enable them to do so. By Regulation 11, a new Member Club is required to leave League 1 (L1) and start the following season in League 2 (L2). Leeds NewCo wished the League to exercise its discretion so that it could succeed as new owners with the Club playing in L1 from the start of the 2007-8 season.
31. The Board was receptive to the idea. Article 4 and the Insolvency Policy allowed the Board to agree to withdraw the CTN and to register a transfer free of the CTN in circumstances, including on such terms as the Board “in its absolute discretion determines.”
32. As already described Leeds NewCo (and in particular Mr Bates and Mr Mark Taylor) were well aware that in order to secure this indulgence the Board was stipulating that in order to remain in L1 the Club would have to start the new season with a 15 point deficit. This had been agreed by Mr Bates on behalf of the consortium, as the price which had to be paid for the indulgence and they were prepared to pay it – subject only to an Appeal to the League.
33. We are satisfied that Mr Taylor, in his capacity of Director of Leeds NewCo and their solicitor, was fully aware of the content and effect of what he was signing. Earlier that day he had received a letter from Mr Craig in which he had stated there was to be ‘a legally binding agreement’ in which the Claimants would undertake to observe and perform each of the conditions set out, and “waive any and all claims against the League regarding the sanction of matters arising out of the administration generally.” Mr Craig told us that it was not standard practice for him to include release and waiver clauses in agreements between the League and insolvent Member Clubs. He consulted the League Solicitors, and included Clauses 4.1 and 4.2 because the Board had made it clear in its 27 July meeting that the terms of the agreement with Leeds NewCo had to “obviate anyone taking legal action once the process had been completed,” and the Board re-affirmed at its 3 August meeting that they required “an assurance by the club that it would accept the decision of the meeting as final.” As he put it:
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“it was a crucial part of the deal that Leeds NewCo accept the points deduction and not seek to challenge it or have it overturned other than by means of the appeal to its fellow Member Clubs, as permitted by Clause 3.”
34. We conclude that it is inherently improbable that Mr Taylor, as a solicitor of longstanding experience, would have put his signature to the document if he had intended to reserve the position that it is now adopted by the Claimants that the points deduction was outside the powers of the Board or was an improper exercise of its discretion. A simple ‘save as to the legality of the Condition’ phrase could have been proposed. We are satisfied that if he had attempted to do so, it would undoubtedly have been rejected by the Board, the deal would have been aborted and, in all probability the Club would have gone into liquidation, or at best, been relegated to League 2.
35. Finally, returning to Clause 4 the operative parts for our consideration are:

“4.1 Leeds hereby release the League ... from all claims, whether known or unknown to Leeds, which Leeds has or may have against [the League] arising out of or connected, whether directly or indirectly with ... the conduct of the League with regards to OldCo, the Conditions and the imposition of the sanction or, if passed, the Appeal Sanction (the “Claims”). (Emphasis added) 4.2 Except for the obligations created by this Agreement Leeds hereby covenants that it shall not ... commence, or threaten to commence any proceedings in any jurisdiction before any court, arbitration body ... against [the League] ... arising out of or connected, whether directly or indirectly with any of the Claims”. (Emphasis added) The effect of this Clause is that Leeds NewCo agreed to release the League from the claims now advanced and waived any right to do so. They also covenanted not to bring the claims it now seeks to bring. CONCLUSION
36. We are satisfied that the Claimants case begins and ends with the Compromise Agreement which clearly embodied the intention of both parties. Taking the Agreement as a whole and in particular Clause 4 Leeds NewCo agreed to the imposition of the 15 points and to release the League from the claims which have now been advanced and to waive any rights to do so. Leeds NewCo specifically covenanted
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not to bring the claims it has now sought to assert and there is no basis to allow it not to honour that covenant.

The Tribunal dismisses the Claim on this ground alone. DELAY AND THE EFFECT ON OTHER CLUBS
A. Delay between 9 August and 12 February 2008
37. Even if the Claimants could avoid the effect of the release and waiver they still faced a formidable obstacle. On 9 August 2007, the League’s member clubs by the requisite majority dismissed NewCo’s Appeal and confirmed the Board’s decision to transfer of the League membership to the First Claimant with the Condition.
38. The First Claimant first tried to get The Football Association (FA) to hold an inquiry into the validity of the League’s decision to impose the Condition. The Football Association declined to hold an inquiry based (among other things) on its clear view that the imposition of the Condition as a condition of consent to transfer of membership to the First Claimant was within the League’s powers and was a proportionate exercise of those powers. Correspondence covered the period 30 August and 5 December 2007. Even so, Leeds NewCo filed a Football Association Rule K arbitration proceedings purporting to challenge the legality of The FA’s decision not to hold such an inquiry.
39. Subsequently, on 4 February 2008, the League received from Mark Taylor, the solicitor acting for the First Claimant, what purported to be a letter before action in the High Court on behalf of the First Claimant in relation to the Condition. That letter did not meet the requirements of the CPR and the Football League directors rejected the letter on that ground.
B. Delay in the High Court Proceedings
40. On 12 February 2008, proceedings were issued in the High Court on behalf of the First Claimant and Barnsley Football Club 2002 Limited against the League. The Claim Form and Particulars of Claim were deemed served on Bird & Bird (FL’s solicitors) on 13 February 2008. The covering letter accompanying these documents asked the League to consent to an application for an expedited hearing.
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41. On 20 February 2008, Bird & Bird wrote to Mark Taylor & Co., pointing out that the parties were subject to a valid pre-existing agreement to submit any disputes between them to arbitration and therefore asking them to agree to a stay of the proceedings in favour of a FA Rule K arbitration. No reply was received to that letter by the stated deadline and therefore Bird & Bird sent a chaser letter on the evening of 25 February 2008.
42. In response, NewCo’s solicitor accepted that the dispute was covered by FA Rule K, and, despite some delay, signed a Consent Order on behalf of the First Claimant, providing for the mandatory stay of the proceedings in favour of a FA Rule K arbitration. Mark Taylor agreed to conduct the arbitration on an expedited basis, because of the potential impact on 2007/08 final League standings. The full hearing on the merits was therefore provisionally scheduled for 16-18 April 2008.
43. However, no such agreement was forthcoming on behalf of Barnsley. Instead, it became apparent that Mark Taylor did not have authority to act on behalf of Barnsley. On 25 February 2008, the League received a letter by fax from Brabners Chaffe Street LLP, acting “on behalf of Barnsley Football Club Limited”. The letter states:

“... We understand that our client has telephoned your Lord Mawhinney to inform you that our client did not agree to lend its name to the above proceedings and that it had not approved the Particulars of Claim before they were filed at Court (or indeed since). We are investigating the position on behalf of our client but wish to set the record straight at this earliest opportunity ...”
44. On 25 February 2008, Bird & Bird sent a letter by fax asking Mark Taylor for his urgent comments on the suggestion in Brabners’ letter that the proceedings had been brought without Barnsley’s authority. No such comments were received. Over the following days, Bird & Bird sought (without success) clarification on the position of Barnsley from Mark Taylor.
45. On 7 March Bird & Bird called Mark Taylor to clarify, as a matter of urgency, whether or not he was authorised to act for Barnsley in relation to the proceedings.
46. On 11 March Bird & Bird received an email sent on behalf of Mark Taylor attaching a copy of the Notice of Discontinuance signed on behalf of Barnsley. On the same day Bird
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& Bird filed at Court the signed Consent Order and a copy of the Notice of Discontinuance.
47. Thus there was a delay of about 5 weeks primarily due to the misconceived High Court proceedings commenced by NewCo’s solicitors and their conduct of them.
C. Delay in the Arbitration Proceedings
48. On 4 March 2008, Bird & Bird sent Mark Taylor a letter by fax confirming that the League agreed to the First Claimant’s request that Arbitration be conducted in an expedited manner and set out some practical measures for achieving this. They included that (i) the First Claimant serve a Notice of Arbitration, as required pursuant to FA Rule K2(a)(i), in order to commence the Arbitration proceedings; and (ii) Leeds serve a Points of Claim in order to assist the tribunal to define and identify the true issues for the tribunal. The letter invited Mark Taylor to serve the Points of Claim by 10 March 2008.
49. On 7 March 2008, Bird & Bird received a letter from Mark Taylor sent by fax, in which he agreed to serve a Notice of Arbitration but stated that the Points of Claim would consist of the Particulars of Claim issued in the High Court.
50. On Saturday 8 March, Jonathan Taylor of Bird & Bird sent a letter by email to Mark Taylor requesting (among other things) that the Notice of Arbitration be served during the morning of 10 March 2008 at the latest and that a hearing of the tribunal be convened at short notice for the purpose of making directions on 11, 12 or 13 March 2008.
51. On 9 March 2008, Jonathan Taylor received an email from Mark Taylor confirming that the Notice of Arbitration would be served on 10 March 2008. In fact, the Notice of Arbitration was not served until 19 March 2008. Thereafter there may have been some dilatoriness on behalf of the Claimant but we do not regard it as critical or significant.
52. Leeds NewCo has neither tendered a credible explanation nor convincing excuse for their delay.

CONCLUSION
53. It is inescapable that if the appropriate Arbitration proceedings had been commenced in August or September or even October 2007 they would have been capable of resolution
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before the end of 2007. Given the date when these proceedings were started (19 March) and the first day of the Hearing before this Tribunal (16 April) it is obvious that our decision could have been given comfortably before the end of 2007.
54. With this history of events we are satisfied that there has been unreasonable and inexcusable delay on the part of Leeds NewCo. It is plain that Leeds NewCo was in the same position in August as it was in March when it finally got around to commencing these Arbitral Proceedings. It was imperative that the appropriate action was taken expeditiously. When the High Court proceedings were commenced they were in breach of the Arbitration Clause in the Regulations. Even before the arbitration proceedings were finally commenced, the Claimants were dilatory in initiating them.
55. There was no reason, if Leeds NewCo were genuinely concerned and disgruntled with the outcome of the League Members decision on 9 July, why they should not or could not commence Regulation K arbitration proceedings soon thereafter. This step could have been taken simultaneously with the Regulation K proceedings against the Football Association. They then held back and commenced the misconceived and abortive High Court proceedings. By delaying seven months before commencing these proceedings (August – March) they were in danger of prejudicing the other Clubs in League 1 who were also fighting for promotion.
56. The resolution of this present challenge has been left to the eleventh hour. If the points were now to be restored a number of clubs eligible for automatic promotion and the play off positions might have been affected. As at 5 April 2008 there were two clubs entitled to automatic promotion and four other clubs entitled to a place in the play-off for the third promotion spot, with Leeds in sixth position. On 1 May the position is still the same.
57. If the 15 points were now to be restored it would place Leeds comfortably in second position (88 points) and with assured promotion. This would prejudice the second placed Club (currently Doncaster) by depriving it of its automatic promotion place, forcing it to compete for promotion through the play off process. This situation is worthy of our particular and sympathetic consideration. Thus the delayed restoration of points would, inevitably, and fundamentally alter the rights that would otherwise accrue to another club.
58. We have no doubt that if this dispute had been promptly and properly brought, then the other clubs vying for promotion might have addressed their season in a different way.
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Until 19 March they will have proceeded on the legitimate assumption that there was to be no challenge and that the 15 points would not be restored. This late challenge brought uncertainty to the League near the end of the season at a time when other clubs had an understandable hope and expectation that they would enjoy automatic promotion, or the opportunity to compete for promotion through the play-off. In Stevenage Borough Football Club v The Football League Ltd CH [1996] 5 No 3043 Carnwath J was dealing with a similar case of delay and dismissed the proceedings. We see no reason to depart from his approach and apply it to the instant case.
59. We also dismiss the Claimant’s Claim on the ground of Leeds NewCo’s unreasonable and inexcusable delay in bringing the claim to this Arbitration.

THE CLAIMANT’S ALTERNATIVE CASE
60. As the Tribunal has already decided to dismiss the Claim on the two grounds specified above it is not necessary to undertake a detailed analysis of the alternative Case. We merely record in summary form what our conclusions would have been.
61. Mr David Phillips QC submitted that Clause 4 of the Compromise Agreement was entered into under a mutual mistake of law common to both parties and is consequently ‘void ab initio’. The parties were mistaken as to the League’s power to impose the 15 point Condition. It was a penalty which the League had no power to impose.
62. We are satisfied that by virtue of Article 41, Article 4 and Article 6 the Board had all the requisite authority to exercise its powers and discretion to impose a Condition of a 15 point deduction. Moreover, the Insolvency Policy (in particular G5), properly construed, did not prevent the Board imposing the Condition. The assertion that the Board lacked the power to impose the Condition is unsustainable.
63. Mr Phillips also contended that the Board and the League in reaching their decisions acted unfairly and unreasonably. We have no hesitation in rejecting this argument. The Board came to the conclusion that the point’s deduction should be made a Condition of consent to the Cancellation of Withdrawal and Transfer as the most reasonable and proportionate way of protecting the legitimate needs underlying the Insolvency Policy. In doing so it rejected the other options open to the Board which included
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(i) Simply expelling Leeds OldCo, so that Leeds United FC ceased to exist;
(ii) Allowing Leeds NewCo to join the Football League in L2, pursuant to regulation 11.
64. Given the absolute discretion afforded to the Board in this respect by the Memorandum, Articles of Association and the Insolvency Policy and having regard to the margin of appreciation afforded to a sport’s governing body, the Claimant would have failed to establish that the Board’s decision (or the League’s) to include the points Condition was a decision that no rational decision maker in their position could make. As to the amount of points deducted it carefully carried out a balancing exercise between 0 to 20 and arrived at a decision that, in all the circumstances of this particular case (which we do not need to recite) was well within the range of decision reasonably open to it to make.

ROTHERHAM
65. The position of Rotherham can be dealt with summarily. This Club was also insolvent and went into Administration on 18 March 2008. It is likely that it will not be able to exit administration via a CVA and the Administrators will be obliged to sell the Club. The Club fears that if the League’s decision to deduct 15 points from Leeds is a precedent, then the same condition will be applied to them. They therefore wish to support the Claimant’s case and seek similar declaratory relief.
66. Mr Stephen Davies QC on behalf of the League submitted that Rotherham has no status (locus) in these proceedings. There is no dispute between Rotherham and the League. Rotherham cannot attempt to support Leeds in its challenge to the Compromise Agreement in an attempt to get round the fact Leeds NewCo has compromised its Claim.
67. The tribunal considered that the answer is to be found in Rule K which provides that the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal is confined to:

“any dispute or difference between any two or more participants ... shall be referred to arbitration and finally resolved by arbitration under these Rules.”
The only dispute is between Leeds NewCo and the League. There is no dispute between Rotherham and the League. The fear that they may be deducted 15 (or indeed, any)
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points is not sufficient to amount to a ‘dispute’. The League has not yet reached a determination of its case in the light of all the relevant circumstances.
68. Thus Rotherham have no right to declaratory relief in respect of the claim to such relief by Leeds, nor in respect of a decision which has not yet been, and might not even be, taken against Rotherham itself.
69. Accordingly the Tribunal has declined jurisdiction and dismissed Rotherham’s purported claim.

THE AWARD The Award of the Tribunal is that the Claims of both Claimants are dismissed. Sir Philip Otton Chairman .................................... Peter Leaver QC Arbitrator ................................... Peter Cadman Arbitrator ...................................
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POSTSCRIPT
1. During the four days of the Hearing we heard other evidence, arguments, submissions from both parties and certain ideas and suggestions were exchanged between Counsel and the Tribunal. In view of the two principle decisions in the Award it is not necessary to take such matters further.
2. However these proceedings have brought to light the necessity for a review of the Insolvency Policy. We were told that there are 40 or more current or anticipated insolvencies. In many cases (e.g. Rotherham, Luton Town and Bournemouth?) it will prove impossible to exit Administration via a CVA. The League in the course of the Hearing appeared to recognise the need to amend the Policy to make specific provisions where there is no CVA. It is to be hoped that this can be achieved during the coming close season. The Clubs should be entitled to clear guidelines, objectives and procedures.
3. The Board should be astute not to think in terms of ‘penalty’ or a ‘norm’ as a starting point of whatever Condition is to be imposed. We are concerned that the Condition was described by the Board as a ‘penalty’ and was understandably perceived to be so.
4. We accept that the imposition of the 15 points in the instant case was not (and was not intended to be) a precedent, i.e. an automatic sanction in the absence of a CVA. Each case has to be assessed by the League having regard to the Club’s individual circumstances leading up to and of the insolvency itself. Such Conditions as the League considers are required will reflect these circumstances and any merits the Club can establish.
5. We feel obliged to record that we consider an Appeal to Members of the League to be unsatisfactory. Some Clubs in the same League may not readily agree to reduce a points sanction in the understandable self-interest of their Clubs. We recommend:
1. That there should be an appeal to an Independent Tribunal;
2. In order to reduce uncertainty for the Club and other Clubs the Appeal process should be determined without delay. We suggest an Appeal should be lodged within 7 days of the decision and the decision of the Appeal body should be given within 21 days thereafter.
6. We hope that these suggestions will be helpful to all concerned.
Sir Philip Otton Chairman ....................................
Peter Leaver QC Arbitrator ...................................
Peter Cadman Arbitrator ...................................

Leeds United's -15-Point Saga - What You Should Know.

Arbitration is a well-established and widely used alternative to the courts for the settlement of disputes between parties. There are 2 conditions precedent to the beginning of an arbitration process. First, the parties select (an) impartial, independent third (party or) parties, called (an arbitrator) arbitrators; and second, they agree to be bound by the arbitrator’s award. Thereafter, the hearing begins, and both sides present their testimony.
While the arbitrator’s responsibilities are a function of the provisions of the arbitration agreement, certain duties nonetheless lie on the arbitrator, including impartiality.
In a binding arbitration, the arbitrator’s award is usually final and is rarely subject to judicial reexamination.

This background is germane for the purposes of
(a) deconstructing the circumstances surrounding the ongoing arbitration involving Leeds United Football Club and the Football League;
(b) fostering a better understanding of the arbitration process and its possible outcomes; and
(c) thereby understanding the arbitration process from the standpoint of Leeds United.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Towards the tail end of the 2006-07 season, Leeds United, burdened by insurmountable debts and facing imminent relegation to the third tier of the English league for the first time in their history, entered administration. According to the Football League rules in force at the time, a football club which entered administration received an automatic punishment of a 10-point deduction. Thus the sanction was duly applied without much ado, and Leeds United, already several points adrift of safety, were relegated. At the time, the club were owned by a Swiss-based corporation, Forward Sports Fund, whose representative was Ken Bates, Chairman of Leeds United.

Subsequently administrators for the Football Club were appointed, in the shape of the internationally-renowned accounting and consultancy outfit KPMG. On its website (http://www.kpmg.com/About/), KPMG describes itself in these words: KPMG is a global network of professional firms providing Audit, Tax, and Advisory services.

Over the summer of 2007, KPMG attempted to bring Leeds United out of administration through a Company Voluntary Agreement (CVA) as mandatorily prescribed by the rules of the Football League. A football club cannot, in other words, exit administration sans CVA under the Football League’s somewhat limited rules. There were several consortia in the fray with bids to buy the Elland Road club, but the winning bid was the one presented by Leeds United 2007 Ltd, a consortium led by the aforementioned Ken Bates.

Under the terms of the Football League’s rules for exiting administration, certain debts, known as “football debts” were to be settled in full. Football debts include player remuneration and fees owed to other football clubs for the purchase of players. Individuals and entities in this category were therefore secured creditors. Conversely, non-football debts were debts which were owed to individuals or entities such as businesses providing say, catering services or stadium security, and these were non-secured creditors. Now here was the rub: non-football debts also, under the new rules introduced by the Football League, now ominously included those owed to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). In other words, the Taxman was considered pari passu with caterers and sundry tradesmen providing services to a football club for the purposes of debt-settlement in administration proceedings.

Needless to say, HMRC were exceedingly unhappy with this state of affairs. When the CVA from a consortium called Leeds United 2007 Ltd led by the aforementioned Ken Bates was accepted and subsequently received endorsement of 75.1% of creditors by value, HMRC opposed it. Interestingly enough, the Football League also opposed it, for its own reasons, even though the CVA per se was in compliance with its regulations. Nonetheless with the aforementioned approval of 75.1% of creditors by value, the CVA passed and Leeds United reverted to the ownership of a new entity called Leeds United 2007 Ltd., with Ken Bates at its helm as chairman. Thereafter HMRC, as expected, filed a High Court writ opposing the CVA whereby Leeds United Football Club passed to the ownership of Leeds United 2007. Whilst paying secured creditors in full, the CVA would have paid unsecured creditors, including HMRC, 1 penny in the pound. HMRC, owed £7 million, therefore stood to come away with only a paltry £70,000.

One of the prime functions of the administrator was to guide the club successfully out of administration and into solvency through sale of the football club to a consortium which in its professional judgment and after due diligence stood the best chance of guaranteeing that club’s financial solvency into the foreseeable future. Somehow, through the administration process, the consortium which had taken the Football Club into administration was the same one –howbeit under a different name—which was deemed the best of all bidders available.

HMRC’s subsequent judicial challenge of the CVA surprised nobody. The crux of their challenge was the rules of the Football League under which they were second class citizens, as distinct from the CVA per se. With this challenge, the club could not exit administration, creating an onerous burden for the administrators to source for funds to keep the club in business until it could be disposed of through a CVA; sell the club outright; or go into winding-up.

The administrators solved this problem by rescinding the CVA and then making an outright sale of Leeds United Football Club to the highest bidder in a closed process–in this case, once more, Ken Bates and his Leeds United 2007 Ltd. This sale by KPMG was, of course, in breach of the Football League’s own rules that clubs must exit administration via a CVA.

Without a CVA, Leeds United 2007 Ltd. now needed the Football League’s approval to get back its Golden Share without which it could not conduct business as a member of the Football League. The club sought such reinstatement under the League’s Exceptional Circumstances clause. As the Elland Road club had exited administration sans the League-mandated CVA, the league decided to impose a 15-point penalty on Leeds to begin the 2007-08 season as a condition precedent to returning United’s Golden share. It was a decision which Leeds, understandably, appealed.

League chairman Brian Mawhinney turned the disposition of the appeal over to the other Football League clubs. In one of the most brazen displays of conflict of interest, “an overwhelming majority” of the clubs, including those within the 3rd tier of the Football League, voted overwhelmingly in favor of the unprecedented sanction. These incidents occurred during a period of roughly over 3 months from May-August 2007.

Beginning in late August 2007, Leeds requested an independent review of both the initial decision and the subsequent adverse decision of the rival clubs made on appeal. This request was turned down summarily by the Football League. Similarly, subsequent representations to the Football Association for a review of the Football League’s actions were dismissed. In the end, irrespective of having signed an undertaking not to litigate any adverse decision reached by the Football League prior to the return of the club’s Golden Share, Leeds United were compelled to, in February 2007, issue a writ in the High Court against the Football League, whose chairman Mawhinney loudly and brashly pledged a “robust defense” of the League’s position.

Learned counsel for Leeds United stated that the undertaking was a nullity given the fact that at the time the club signed it, they had labored under a misapprehension that the Football League indeed had the powers it purported to be exercising when, in fact, it did not.

After Mawhinney’s “robust defense” boasts, it was something of a letdown when the Football League, on the very last day it had to respond to the Elland Road club's writ, suddenly turned round and offered arbitration. Which, when you think about it, was what Leeds had been asking for from the very beginning.

The composition of the arbitration panel, which finally commenced 4 days of hearings on Wednesday April 23 2008, comprises of retired High Court judge Sir Philip Otton who will chair the proceedings; former Premier League chief executive Peter Leaver; and Peter Cadman, a lawyer who has chaired past Premier League disciplinary commissions.

And so here we are now: Argument and presentation of evidence ended on Monday April 28. The arbitrators expect to announce their decision at the very latest on Thursday May 1. The league season ends on Saturday May 3.

At this point in time, the arguments advanced by Leeds United may or may not be built on these issues:

1. Whether Leeds had broken a Football League rule in exiting administration; and if so, what was the rule? In this case, KPMG sold Leeds United to the highest bidder outright in the exceptional circumstances created by HMRC’s challenge of what was essentially the Football League’s reduction of the Taxman to a mere tradesman. Leeds United did not sell itself to itself. So, in those circumstances, what rule did Leeds United Football Club break?

2. Whether it is proper to visit sanction on the affected football club in the event that Football League rules concerning procedures for exiting administration conflict with Tax laws thus preventing the club from abiding by Football League rules. In this case, HMRC judicially challenged the CVA which had satisfied FL rules, thereby placing KPMG in a quandary and exposing the flaws of the CVA-only stipulation.

3. Whether or not it was promoting a conflict of interest for the Football League to invite other League 1 clubs –rivals of Leeds United for advantage in the standings—to vote on an issue from whose outcome they might derive a pecuniary advantage.

Speculation is rife regarding Leeds getting some points back. From my position however, it seems a relatively narrow case: either Leeds have broken a rule or some rules, or they have not. If they have broken some rules, then the sanction may be deemed proper depending on whether or not its harshness and the involvement of other self-interested clubs in its confirmation was made an issue. If however it is held that Leeds had broken no rules, then the correct action in equity will be the return of all 15 points rightfully earned by Leeds this season.

At this point, Leeds lie 6th in the League table with 73 points, 16 points behind leaders Swansea City, with 1 game to go. This is the last play-off position. The return of the 15 points will catapult Leeds to 2nd with 88 points, push Doncaster Rovers, Nottingham Forest, Carlisle United and Southend United into 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th respectively, and leave Swansea City needing to win its final game to secure the 3rd division championship. Of course, as a Leeds fan, I am hoping we get our 15 points back, win our last game, see Swansea City lose theirs, and carry the title. That will bring some much-needed respite to long suffering Leeds fans buffeted by the vagaries and tragedies of the past 4 years.

In the end, there can be no denying that the Football League acted improperly and less than honorably in the disposition of the Leeds United case. As more clubs enter administration –which will continue to be a recurring phenomenon until the Football League imposes caps on salaries and borrowing—HMRC will judicially oppose all CVAs where it is an unsecured creditor, putting these clubs in the position of tasting the same medicine they dished out to Leeds.

This is a self-defeating state of affairs. Because the fiscal soundness of clubs is in the Football League’s own best interest (it earns revenue from the clubs), it is hardly far fetched to propose that the Football League should revisit its rules; review the CVA-only stipulation; and consider other ways to support and revive clubs which enter administration outside of merely docking them 10 points. And 15 points for when their administrators are compelled to take them out of administration without a CVA.

No Longer at Ease.

So much for the blind optimism exuded in my preview. I must however point out that I have always expressed little confidence in Berti Vogts's coaching ability. In this respect, my prognostications are just that—prognostications are, after all, made not on the basis of some scientific or methodical analysis but on auguries. In this case, it was a combination of some wistful timeline augury and faith in what the players were capable of achieving in spite of the coach. In reality, there is only so much that these players can do. The rest is a function of proper tactical preparation and unless they are getting that, they can never live up to their true potential as a team.

Nigeria beat the Republic of Benin Squirrels 2-0 in the final group game to edge through into the quarter finals of the ongoing CAN in Ghana. A modest success which maintains our record of progressing beyond the first round in all CAN finals we have been at since 1976 bar the Libya ’82 edition. Unfortunately, we were never masters of our own fate from the moment we were defeated 1-0 by what, to many sound judges, is the current best team in Africa, Ivory Coast, and then could only muster a sterile draw with the Eagles of Mali who frankly carried more threat and paraded an offense which appeared more potent than ours. Our immediate fate rested eventually on whether Mali and Ivory Coast would come to a Francophone accord, with both teams guaranteed a quarter final placing with a draw of any sort. In this respect, Ivory Coast’s comprehensive 3-0 dismissal of Mali allied to our much-needed 2-0 win over Benin has seen us qualify –by the skin of our teeth –through a back door somebody forgot to lock.

Given our shambolic performances since the tournament began –overawed by Ivory Coast, outfinessed and outhustled by Mali—we do not look like the imperious, dominating Nigeria which fans of African football have grown accustomed to. In his first two games, the mundane, defensive-minded approach which was simultaneously bereft of high-level organization, which Vogts has became all too apparent. Obi’s deployment as a shield for the defense means that we lack the creative flair upfield that is a prerequisite for slicing open defenses, and Obi emphasized this by burying a header and then carving Benin open for Aiyegbeni to score the winner. On that evidence, I would deploy Obi in a more forward role and place the robust Olofinjana, all-action Etuhu or cultured Eromoigbe in the holding role. But I’m not Vogts.

The Mali midfield ran us ragged in the opening exchanges, showing a level of commitment and athleticism which initially befuddled us. They drew us into their harum-scarum game plan when a past Nigeria would have put their collective foot on the ball and knocked it about to knock the stuffing out of them. Some of our players appeared to be playing scared: scared to be caught in possession, scared to take risks, scared to make the purposeful and intentional attacking passes, opting too often for the hopeful ball upfield to Yakubu Aiyegbeni and Obafemi Martins, both of whom disappointed to varying degrees. Martins’ first touch has never been top class, and as I’ve noted time and again, he is at his best in the hand-to-hand combat of the penalty area rather than fielding long passes and holding the ball up, which the heavily criticized Makinwa is better physically capable of. Unfortunately our attack has not been constructed to play to their strengths, nor has Makinwa ever appeared to have received instructions to stay central and hold the ball up. As for Aiyegbeni, in the beginning, he was the only player with the confidence to hold the ball and run at Mali’s defense, and this arrogant quality is a must for all strikers. Unfortunately his decision making wasn’t always the best. As the game progressed, Obinna Nsofor and Osaze Odemwingie also came into their own with their willingness to hold the ball and run at the Malians. When Nsofor and Odemwingie were inexplicably substituted, our attack sputtered to a halt.

High level organization for me means that the side has a collective awareness of teammate positioning and passing outlets under pressure. I can bang the ball upfield to so-and-so and know how he wants it to land and exactly which side he wants it—think of Leeds United in their glory days under Don Revie, with their center-forwards Mick Jones and supersub Joe Jordan creating outlets for their defense from pressure; then juxtapose that to the aimless long balls which were immediately claimed by the Mali defense to launch fresh attacks. As a defender, I can make a tackle and clear the ball somewhere and know that a teammate will be in the vicinity to claim or challenge for the ball –think of Louis van Gaal’s disciplined Ajax Amsterdam combination of the early to mid 1990’s; and juxtapose that to Yobo’s clearance that led to Kalou’s winner. I can come under pressure and know that there is an opening for me to pass the ball forward through to a teammate who has dropped back to receive it –think of France under Henri Michel at the 1986 World Cup; and juxtapose that with the countless unconstructive clearances from our defense. In short, none of these qualities were apparent in any of the games we’ve played in this first round.

For me, there is no quality Nigeria team right now. We have some good players, first class players, first rate players and some up-and-coming youngsters with promise. But that’s about it. We will have a team in my eyes when we can play as a collective applying the individual talent of each player to the common group task and objective; and defense, midfield and offense interlock seamlessly, with smooth transitions and players can turn deep defense into sudden penetrating attack with one killing pass.

In my eyes, a top quality team properly so-called is one wherein the players:
(a) are deployed in the positions wherein their skills can best be maximized;
(b) are constantly on the move within assigned spheres of offensive and defensive responsibilities with license to roam for support play;
(c) have a common ethos of possession being nine-tenths of the law –put your foot on the ball, control it, and pass it around however the circumstances of the game and your talent dictate;
(d) create and finish a plethora of scoring openings;
(e) keep it tight at the back.

Nigeria under Vogts doesn’t qualify under these standards.

It all begins with the defense: Yobo is a solid defender, but his first instinct is to play the long ball rather than the constructive pass characteristic of the likes of Stephen Keshi, Uche Okechukwu, Chidi Nwanu and Uche Okafor before him. If the pass can be made, and it is not being made, we must know why. If it is not being made because it cannot be made, then we must also know why.

Actually there are so many “why”s. From the Mali game alone, these questions were asked:

Why is right-back Nwaneri constantly drawn central, leaving a huge gap on the flanks?
Why was there nobody to cover for Nwaneri whenever he went upfield?
Why was the midfield unable to create chances for the offense over 2 games?
Why did Taiwo elect not to have a go at goal throughout the Mali match?
Why were Nigeria overawed by Ivory Coast at all?
Why is Obi wasted sitting in front of the backline when his passing talent can tear open defenses?

Berti Vogts knows what Berti Vogts thinks. At least Berti has a sense of self-preservation as the relatively attacking deployment against Benin showed.

On to the quarter finals, where we meet hosts Ghana in Accra. Ghana have ridden on a tidal wave of frenzied home support to amass 9 points from 3 games, and the Black Stars will be confident coming from their 2-0 win in their last group match over one of the pre-tournament favorites, now-eliminated Morocco.

Although we have held the Indian sign over Ghana for about 10 years now, the Black Stars routed a makeshift Nigeria side 4-1 in a friendly in Brentford last year, and are definitely a side on the rise with top class performers amongst Europe’s top sides, including the formidable Michael Essien. In Essien, Sulley Muntari and Asamoah Gyan, they have probably the midfield of the African moment. Vogts looks set to be the first Nigeria coach since Otto Gloria and Gottlieb Goller in 1982 not to reach the semi-finals. At least he can claim to have gone one better than the duo by qualifying for the quarter finals. Nonetheless, given the criticism of the AKE Trio (that is, Shaibu Amodu, Stephen Keshi and Joe Erico), Christian Chukwu and Austin Eguavoen for only achieving 3rd place classifications in successive tournaments, a mere quarter final finish by Vogts will qualify as an unmitigated failure.

With their rising profile, an attack that is clicking; the massive home support and high expectations, a Ghana win will be on the cards, but there is an old saying, as old as the beautiful game itself: Football is not mathematics.

Third Cup of African Nations Triumph for Nigeria.

New Kids on the Block

The Nigeria Football Association (NFA) announced the Nigeria squad for the Cup of African Nations (CAN) finals, Ghana 2008, on Friday January 11 2008. The complement of the squad includes 8 debutants, namely:

Rabiu “Robocop” Afolabi, a controlling center-half who skippered Nigeria’s ill-starred U-19 World Cup team of 1999.

Danny Shittu, experienced powerhouse center-half who has spent the bulk of his career in the Championship in England with QPR and Watford.

Onyekachi Apam, center-half in Samson Siasia’s World Youth Cup team of 2005 who is equally comfortable as a flank defender and could step into the breach created by Chidi Odiah’s injury.

Ifeanyi Emeghara, flank defender with former European Champions Steaua Bucharest (Romania) who looks set to fill in for the injured Chidi Odiah.

Richard Eromoigbe, the Levski Sofia midfielder who was part of the Nigeria U-17 side beaten in the final of the Trinidad and Tobago tournament in 2001.

Onyekachi Okonkwo, a midfielder who was the creative force behind Enyimba of Aba’s two consecutive African Champions League (formerly the African Cup of Champion Clubs) triumphs.
Dickson Etuhu, the former Preston central midfielder who is a robust and aggressive box to box player, now with Sunderland, whom David Platt attempted to persuade to play for England, thereby delaying his Nigeria cap until the emergence of Vogts.

Ikechukwu Uche, a striker with Spain’s Recreativo Huelva.

There are no players in the final selection who are from Nigeria’s domestic league, or, for that matter –and a preposterous suggestion in my book—from Nigeria’s 2007 U-17 world champions. The names often touted from that cadet side are those of striker Chrysanthus Macaulay and midfield general Rabiu Ibrahim.

Superstitions and Auguries
2 years ago, in the lead-up to the World Cup Finals in Germany, I speculated on the possibilities of the champion emerging from one of these 3 nations: Germany, Brazil and Italy.
Germany and Brazil, because, although they have met in the final only once –2002—either nation has been involved in every final since 1950 bar Argentina ’78 –an event wherein Brazil’s involvement in the final was foiled by host nation Argentina’s suspicious and convenient 6-0 defeat of Peru which precipitated a FIFA rule change; Italy because they had developed a habit of making the final every dozen years since 1970. See http://forum.cybereagles.com/viewtopic.php?t=69356&highlight=; http://forum.cybereagles.com/viewtopic.php?t=66148&highlight=; and http://forum.cybereagles.com/viewtopic.php?t=68938&highlight=.

Before I proceed to discuss the Nigeria squad, I’d like to express wonder as to whether Nigeria is beginning to fall into an Italy-style pattern. Our first serious involvement with the CAN tourney began in 1976 in Ethiopia when a side coached by the Yugoslav Jelisavic Tihomir (aka Father Tiko) finished 3rd in the tourney. Our 1978 experience in Ghana –again with Coach Tiko in charge—ended with a similar 3rd place classification –abetted in part by the coruscating winger Adokiye Amesiamaka’s error in the semi-final against Uganda which gifted the Cranes the winner. Finally, in 1980, with the Brazilian Professor Otto Gloria in charge assisted by Raul Carlesco, we carried the maiden Unity Cup at home, defeating a young Algerian side which included the likes of Rabah Madjer, Lakhdar Belloumi, Djamel Menad and Ali Ferghani—3-0 in a classic final with a clinical brace from the Golden Boy, ‘Segun “Mathematical” Odegbami and a solid, well-walloped finish from Aloysius “Blockbuster” Atuegbu’s thunder boots.

Presaging Nigeria’s second CAN victory, was a string of second and third place finishes –2nd to Cameroon in Ivory Coast 1984 and Morocco 1988; 2nd to Algeria in Algeria 1990; 3rd place beating Cameroon in Senegal ’92 before annexing the trophy in 1994 in Tunisia with what is widely acknowledged as the touchstone team, Clemens Westerhof’s 1994 Eagles iteration. Exactly 14 years had elapsed between it and the 1980 triumph.

14 years on from 1994, Nigeria kicks off its campaign on January 21 in Sekondi against a powerful Ivory Coast –which 2 years ago in Egypt needed a suspiciously offside-looking goal from Didier Drogba to eliminate Nigeria in the semi-finals. In the intervening period, Nigeria has finished 2nd (2000 in Nigeria-Ghana) to Cameroon; 3rd in 2002, beating Mali; 3rd in 2004 again beating Mali; and 3rd in 2006.

Will Nigeria win this tourney to confirm the existence of a 14-year cycle? Will the form book stay true to form for the emergence of a champion from among the old guard? Or will a new champion emerge from the host of ambitious newcomers, audacious “smaller footballing nations”, emergent powerhouses, and traditional also-rans? Time will tell. What is certain from past trends is that Nigeria, an established and genuine African powerhouse, will be in the medal classifications when the last ball is kicked in anger. Anything less will qualify as an upset of monumental proportions.

The Nigeria squad

Name Role Club Country
Dele Aiyenugba Goalkeeper Bnei-Yehuda Israel
Austin Ejide Goalkeeper Bastia France
Vincent Enyeama Goalkeeper Hapoel Tel Aviv Israel
Rabiu Afolabi Defender Sochaux France
Onyekachi Apam Defender Nice France
Ifeanyi Emeghara Defender Steaua Bucharest Romania
Obinna Nwaneri Defender FC Sion Switzerland
Danny Shittu Defender Watford England
Taye Taiwo Defender Marseille France
Joseph Yobo Defender Everton England
Richard Eromoigbe Midfielder Levski Sofia Bulgaria
Dickson Etuhu Midfielder Sunderland England
Mikel Obi Midfielder Chelsea England
Onyekachi Okonkwo Midfielder FC Zurich Switzerland
Seyi Olofinjana Midfielder Wolves England
Yakubu Aiyegbeni Striker Everton England
Nwankwo Kanu Striker Portsmouth England
Ayodele Makinwa Striker Lazio Italy
Obafemi Martins Striker Newcastle England
Obinna Nsofor Striker Chievo Verona Italy
Osaze Odemwingie Striker Lokomotiv Moscow Russia
Ikechukwu Uche Striker Getafe Spain
John Utaka Striker Portsmouth England

What it all Means
The squad above is an interesting admixture of fresh newcomers and established stalwarts. Hopefully the newcomers will prove to be the audacious, irreverent variety with the mischievous intention and attendant self-belief necessary to destroy opponents, and the technical and tactical nous to cause such destruction.

custodians of our onion bag
For the first time since the formidable, granite-featured Peter Rufai in his prime displaced Alloy Agu and Wilfred Agbonavbare, we now have 3 solid goalkeepers in Vincent Enyeama, Austin Ejide and Dele Aiyenugba battling for the number one spot. Enyeama has the advantage in terms of experience, but both he and the sharp-reflexed Aiyenugba are old customers from their Enyimba glory days. Ejide comes into the frame with an impressive physique which is almost reminiscent of Morocco’s 1986 World Cup goalkeeper Badou Zaki and the concomitant potential to physically and psychologically dominate his penalty area. The competition should be intense, and will eliminate complacency.

I think the nod will go to Enyeama.

our defensive line
Of the seven defenders listed, four –Yobo, Nwaneri, Afolabi and Shittu—are center-halves, while Apam, Emeghara and Taiwo provide flank coverage. We are afforded the luxury of a good mix in the choice of our central defensive pairing –and my preference would be for a pairing of the solid, astute but error-prone Yobo and Nwaneri, a player of stylish authority who is Enyimba’s greatest ever captain; Yobo and the controlling Afolabi; or Afolabi and Nwaneri. The muscular Shittu has been a powerful contributor for Watford the past couple of years, and weighed in with more than his fair share of goals from set pieces this season; however the odds of a player who has made most of his career in the division below the Premiership in England having a little bit of trouble adjusting to the trickery of African international football players in the continent’s showpiece tourney, are not remote. I’d like to be proved wrong.

Where we appear to be somewhat thin on the ground is on Taiwo’s left flank. We have more than enough coverage on the right, with Yobo also capable of filling in at right-back, a position wherein he has appeared for Nigeria in the early 2000’s, including the 2002 World Cup finals. While there is no direct replacement, it is possible that the forced exclusion of Taiwo might compel Vogts to adopt a 3-5-2 formation to compensate.

In a 4-man defense, I think the selection will be, from right to left: Apam, Yobo, Nwaneri and Taiwo. Nwaneri could be displaced by Afolabi or Shittu. Apam may make way for Emeghara. The only certainties to play appear to be skipper Yobo and Taiwo.

our engine room
Nigeria goes to the CAN finals with 5 genuine midfield players, not a significant departure from past practice. In the past tournaments which we have successfully prosecuted, we have approached squad selection with 8 complementary midfielders in mind. The implications of this selection are interesting. To start with, we have brought Dickson Etuhu and Seyi Olofinjana into the frame, two players of similar hard-tackling style and central tendencies. Although Olofinjana weighs in with goals, and Etuhu is a box-to-box type of player, neither has the creative ability or range of passing that would elevate the midfield to a different plane of quality. In Mikel Obi, we of course have one of the finest passers in the African and world game, a player with the ability to take the game by the scruff of the neck and orchestrate affairs, spraying incisive passes from the middle to all corners of the pitch, spreading it about and sowing confusion in defenses. Like Gunter Netzer. Like Fernando Redondo. Like Ghana’s Abdul Razak, a man of Nigerian origins. But this young man is not the new Netzer, not the new Redondo, not the new Abdul Razak. He is John Mikel Obi.

As water-carriers –a term dismissively applied to France’s future World Cup winner Didier Deschamps by Eric Cantona—either Olofinjana or Etuhu –but not both—would complement Obi, fetching and carrying the ball for him, tackling, disrupting the opposition’s rhythm and flow.

Paired with Obi, Okonkwo has the flair to render Nigeria’s midfield creatively murderous. With two midfielders of panache, we can include a “water carrier” –or a “destroyer”, as Clemens Westerhof preferred to describe the role—to anchor the midfield and provide a shield for the defense, and one player behind the front two.

The alternative might be two combative central midfielders –Etuhu and Olofinjana—complemented by 2 flair players out wide who would in turn be supported by flank defenders on the overlap. The limitation of this approach is the limitation of Etuhu and Olofinjana –their passing is hardly world class. Etuhu is in his first ever season in the Premiership with Sunderland. Olofinjana has spent his entire career in England with Championship side Wolves.

Since coming into notice as a promising midfielder who came from deep to shoot –waywardly—from distance during the 2001 U-17 World Cup finals in Trinidad and Tobago, Richard Eromoigbe has matured with perennial Bulgarian powerhouse Levski Sofia into a perceptive passer with the ability to provide defensive coverage. He may add a different sort of value to the combination, especially with his Champions League experience, which Etuhu, for instance, doesn’t bring to the table.

Of course, if all else fails, there is always the option of deploying a workmanlike midfield –Etuhu, Olofinjana, Eromoigbe—leaving the job of orchestrating our attacks to the full-backs and wide players on the flanks, possibly in a 3-5-2 deployment. The chances of this happening are exceedingly remote.

In a 4-4-2 formation, we will certainly see Obi in the frame, and the cultured Eromoigbe should, I think, get the nod ahead of the England-based duo of Olofinjana and Etuhu, with Okonkwo there as well. The fourth man will come from among the striker corps.

our firepower
We go to Ghana with an arsenal of eight strikers: Nsofor, Odemwingie, Utaka, Kanu, Martins, Makinwa, Uche and Aiyegbeni.

I expect to see Nsofor deployed to a left flank position, wherein he has played creditably for us in the past even though he is not a true winger. I see a similar outcome for John Utaka and Osaze Odemwingie, both of whom will be in direct competition for a position out on the right flank. As between the two, although Utaka has scored a few goals for Portsmouth this season versus Osaze who has hit a dry patch since his relocation from France to Russia, Osaze in my opinion makes a more significant cerebral contribution. His reading and anticipation and his ability to dart into space to intercept passes are at a premium for supporting the defense and turning defense into sudden attack. Conversely, the offensively dangerous Utaka has still got to totally overcome the tendency to ball-watch when we are defending.

I think Kanu will either come on from the bench or play in the hole behind the strikers. I expect to see Martins starting, despite the troubles at Newcastle United which have impacted his confidence. For me, Martins is Nigeria’s answer to Gerd Muller. And his ruthless finishing ability harks back to the zenith of Monday Odiaka’s powers. Odiaka was a deadly finisher of renown in Nigeria with the now defunct African Continental Bank (ACB) of Lagos, and his goals won Nigeria 3rd place in the 1985 U-19 World Cup finals in Russia. Deliver the ball to Martins in the penalty area, the penalty box, and he will make the opposition pay. Although he has shown an aptitude for scoring from distance, a player of his size and build is best suited to the calculating, close-quarter, lightning-quick-reflexed, instinctive, stiletto-stabbing, sudden death action of the penalty box. Martins is a jewel of a forward, a player with plyometric potential –the potential to inflict damage with sudden, explosive bursts of speed and power over short distances.

Aiyegbeni reminds me of Amokachi in his bustling style, but has developed into a better finisher than Amo ever was. In his similarity to Amokachi, he is not a true spearhead, but a supporting striker. The one whose physique and style is most closely akin to a spearhead is Lazio’s Ayodele Makinwa. Unfortunately Makinwa has yet to develop the touch and the sense of direction that would reward his industry with goals.

As for Ike Uche, he is poised to be our surprise package. His impressive showing against Mexico underlined his ability, and he comes to the tourney a debutant, potentially a relatively unknown quantity to the rest of the field.

The possible striking permutations are limited to Martins, Makinwa, Uche and Aiyegbeni. Kanu will come on from the bench or fulfill an advanced midfield role. Nsofor will be deployed wide left in midfield; Utaka or Osaze will be out wide right in midfield. This will of course influence the choice of midfield personnel to play alongside Obi.

Three Derbies for Nigeria
Group B

Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Mali, Benin

1/21/08 (Sekondi) Nigeria v Ivory Coast
1/25/08 (Sekondi) Nigeria v Mali
1/29/08 (Sekondi)Nigeria v Benin

Nigeria finds itself in a veritable ECOWAS group, with each and every group match a West African derby. The derby element would, of course, be more pronounced if the Ghana Black Stars were in our group, but they are not. Rather, we find ourselves the lone Anglophone nation among Francophones. And although it is not my intention to predict the outcome of individual group games, because football is a game of uncertainty where tactical deployments, preparations and on-field and off-field decisions and developments have the potential to upset the form book, it is, on paper, apparent that the 2 countries which will make their way out of the group are Nigeria and Ivory Coast, while Mali have genuine potential to cause an upset and progress into the next stage at the expense of either of the big two.

The twin cities site (Sekondi-Takoradi) favors the Ivoriens more than most in the group, it being near the Ivorien border thus affording them strong cross-border support. Nonetheless Sekondi-Takoradi is a happy place for Nigerian sides, the now defunct New Nigerian Bank (NNB) of Benin having annexed the West African Football Union (WAFU) Cup there in a matchup with the powerful local Hasaacas outfit the spine of which, at the time, included Isaac Essuman in goal, Isaac Acquaye and the captain of Ghana, Isaac Paha in central defense, and Edzig, a reserve striker for the Black Stars, at spearhead. Furthermore, the sizeable Nigerian community in Ghana –a phenomenon attributable to the two countries being the major Anglophone brother nations in a largely Francophone sub-region—can provide the Nigerian side with the 12th man effect of fanatical support which neither the Beninoise nor the Malians will have.

Mali's Eagles are a quickly re-emergent force seeking to reprise the glory days of Salif Keita in the sixties and seventies, and Armand Coulibaly in the nineties. They boast the dangerous Frederic Kanoute spearheading their attack and a formidable midfield which includes Seydou Keita, Mahamadou Diarra and Mommo Sissoko. However they lack the group experience of Nigeria and Ivory Coast. The Republic of Benin Squirrels are an interesting proposition, with a couple of Nigerians in their line-up including striker Razak Omotoyosi, formerly with Nigerian club Sunshine Stars of Akure whose defection from the Nigerian game was precipitated by an unjust 5-year ban for an incident where the referee was attacked. Omotoyosi’s drive will be vengeance against a country that has treated him unfairly, not the best of motivations. Outside of him and the first eleven however, the Beninoise do not have strength in depth in terms of quality and experience to damage the aspirations of the group’s big boys.

Mali pose the biggest threat to the big two. Ivory Coast’s human battering ram Didier Drogba will be entering the tournament which starts on the 21st of January after undergoing knee surgery only in December. This runs the risk of compromising their firepower. However if you remove Fredric Kanoute from the Malian lineup, they have no replacements of similar quality, unlike the Ivoriens who also have Aruna Dindane, Arouna Kone and Salomon Kalou, and the Nigerians with their surfeit of top class strikers and a striker struggling to find his footing in Makinwa.

For Nigeria, the only choice before Berti Vogts is to win. This is his task, in order to assuage the long-suffering of Nigeria's massed fans nostalgic for successes akin to all those triumphs of too long ago.

Nigeria’s CAN record since 1976:
Year Venue Classification Coach
1976 Ethiopia 3rd Jelisavic Tihomir (Father Tiko)
1978 Ghana 3rd Jelisavic Tihomir (Father Tiko)
1980 Nigeria Champions Otto Gloria
1982 Libya 1st round exit Otto Gloria; Gottlieb Goller
1984 Ivory Coast 2nd Festus Adegboye Onigbinde; James Sulaiman Peters
1986 Egypt Did not qualify
1988 Morocco 2nd Manfred Hoener; Paul Hamilton
1990 Algeria 2nd Clemens Westerhof
1992 Senegal 3rd Clemens Westerhof
1994 Tunisia Champions Clemens Westerhof
1996 South Africa Boycotted
1998 Burkina Faso Banned
2000 Nigeria-Ghana 2nd Johannes Bonfrere
2002 Mali 3rd Shaibu Amodu; Stephen Keshi; and Joe Erico (The AKE Trio)
2004 Tunisia 3rd Christian Chukwu
2006 Egypt 3rd Austin Eguavoen
2008 Ghana ?? Berti Vogts

Prospective Route to the Final
Going back to my crystal ball, and looking at all 16 teams in the tourney, here are my selections for progress. Victors in bold.

group stages
Group A: Ghana, Morocco to qualify. Guinea and Namibia: first round exits.
Group B: Nigeria, Ivory Coast to qualify. Mali and Benin Republic: first round exits
Group C: Cameroon, Egypt to qualify. Sudan and Zambia: first round exits.
Group D: Senegal, Angola to qualify. South Africa and Tunisia: first round exits.

quarter-finals
Ghana v Ivory Coast
Nigeria v Morocco
Cameroon v Angola
Senegal v Egypt

semi-finals
Ghana v Senegal
Nigeria v Cameroon

third place classification match
Senegal v Cameroon

final
Ghana v Nigeria

Busy Window to Key Upturn in Fortunes?

It’s the transfer window and it’s been a busy time for Leeds United manager Dennis Wise, keen to rebound from a disappointing return of 1 point from a possible 9 during the festive period.
Wise has seen his Leeds side decimated by a combination of injuries -to Jonathan Douglas (out for the season), Jonathan Howson, Mark deVries (loan spell abbreviated; returned to Leicester), Radostin Kishishev and Leon Constantine- suspensions -of Alan Thompson and Matt Heath- and an international call up to the Cup of African Nations (CAN) finals for Angola defender Manuel Rui Marques, and the side’s dire straits particularly in midfield were exacerbated by the recent refusal of midfielder Shaun Derry to return early from a loan spell at Crystal Palace to help resolve the midfield crisis which eventually compelled Wise to field a half-fit Radostin Kishishev against Oldham.

Wise has laid out his stall in no uncertain terms to acquire players who are, firstly, at a certain point in the age spectrum, and secondly, clearly better than the ones currently at Elland Road. His intention is clear: he intends to drag Leeds out of their current slump and reignite the momentum to drive the club forward to the Championship this May.

The past few days have seen the arrivals -and impending arrivals- of a slew of promising young players and internationals. The signing of Finnish U-21 right winger Sebastian Sorsa who has been described as having a good football brain to go with his ability underlines Wise’s intention to feed his strikers with quality deliveries from the flanks. Wise intends to complement Sorsa’s signing with the addition of Bradley Johnson, a promising 20-year-old winger currently playing for our opponents tomorrow, Northampton Town, who will, if he signs, probably play on the opposite flank to Sorsa. These signings will address the issue of a noticeable lack of offensive width which has been a talking point since the beginning of this season.

Apart from Sorsa, already signed also, is Birmingham City’s Australian international midfielder Neil Kilkenny, a player who has what it takes to boss the midfield, pull the strings and play short, accurate passes to feet. While skipper Alan Thompson has fulfilled that role on occasion, at 34 he is now over the hill and cannot reasonably be expected to do this week-in-week-out in a highly physical League 1. The 22-year-old Kilkenny is a premiership class player who began his career at Arsenal and he can infuse a new freshness and dynamism into our attacking approach.

Wise's other targets include Jason Puncheon of Barnet, Daniel Fox of Walsall, Bolton Wanderers' Lubomir Michalik and Luton Town’s Dean Morgan.

Puncheon however is a winger, and it is possible that the signing of Johnson will render the need for him moot. Barnet recently rejected a quarter million pound offer to take Puncheon off their hands, and, in the event that Johnson doesn't sign, Leeds may return with an improved offer for the player.

Walsall’s Fox is a left-back who couldn't come in at a better time: youngster Ben Parker is out with an injury and Andrew Hughes is a right-footed midfielder who has uncomplainingly filled in in a strange position, left-back, and is therefore not a long-term solution. Fox will be out of contract this summer, enabling him to leave Walsall more or less on his own terms although because the former Everton youngster is still only 21, Walsall would be entitled to compensation to be determined by a tribunal. Having rejected improved contract offers from Walsall, he clearly intends to depart for pastures new and Walsall must be keen to cash in. They rejected an initial offer from United for Fox and depending on their overall strategy, Leeds may make an improved offer during this window or take him when his contract expires. Leeds and England legend Allan "Sniffer" Clarke's old club Walsall are definitely between a rock and a hard place.

Dean Morgan, who tormented a pale shadow of Leeds United caretaker-managed by John Carver in a 5-1 Luton win last season, is another player Wise admires and his mobility, pace and trickery could add a new dimension to United’s array of offensive weaponry. However opinion is divided on what this inconsistent forward can offer Leeds that the likes of 15-goal Jermaine Beckford, Tresor Kandol (8 goals) and Tore Andre Flo (3 goals) don't already bring to the table.

As for the Slovakian Michalik, Lubo was on loan at Leeds at the tail end of last season and was instrumental in our unbeaten home form. He is currently playing regularly in the Premiership for Bolton, so his coming to Leeds is doubtful.

Perhaps potentially the most interesting development of this transfer window is the impending arrival at Elland Road next week of two Argentinean internationals from San Lorenzo, a club with which Leeds United has reportedly been in recent negotiations with a view to developing a as-yet-publicly-undefined long-term connection. 23-year-old Jonathan Bottinelli is an international center-half who made his full debut for Argentina last April. 20-year-old Nicolas Bianchi, an U-20 international, is equally comfortable at center-half and left-back. Although both players are only going to be at Leeds United's Thorp Arch facility for trials, Dennis Wise has the option of offering them short-term contracts –9-month ones, according to the Yorkshire Evening Post (YEP) —if they impress. Certainly a central-defensive pairing which includes either of the two plus the division's current best central defender in my book, Manuel Rui Marques, or indeed a defense which includes all three, is an attractive proposition and would, in addition to rendering our defense virtually impregnable, enable us to :
(a) eschew lumping the ball upfield from defense; and
(b) play our way out of this division and the Championship from the back.

Amid all the excitement sparked by the possible capture of these Argentinean players, the Carlos Tevez and Javier Mascherano affairs are a cautionary tale about the differences in player ownership rules and realities between England (and probably much of the rest of the world) on one hand and South America -particularly Argentina- on the other and the avoidable misunderstandings and messes these differences occasion. Finally I am still trying to figure out the motivations for a relationship between an Argentine Copa Libertadores participant and an English League 1 club which would benefit the English club in terms of an influx of Argentinean players. If you have any ideas, I'd love to read them.

In conclusion, it appears to me that Dennis Wise has made every attempt to implement his intention to bring to Leeds United, a better class and quality of player than he already has. This can only bode well for the Elland Road club’s promotion aspirations. And it bodes ill for every other League 1 club and manager.

Nigerian Football: The Way Forward

The write-up below was produced in large part by Football Man with contributions from the signatories during the summer of 2000 after the CAN finals in Ghana-Nigeria and the 2000 Olympics in Australia. Although particulars of the article may be dated, the substance remains relevant today.

Special memo to the Nigerian Football Association, Sports Ministry and the Presidency

Kudos needs to go to Cameroon on their recent victories. Their achievement in cleaning us out at home in the CAN finals was no mean feat, but following in our footsteps and emerging winners in the recent Olympic soccer tournament must awaken all Nigerians of ordinary prudence and common sense to the sheer reality that Nigerian football’s pre-eminence in Africa is now under serious challenge from a legitimate foe, a foe which also boasts something akin to Nigeria’s charisma.

We have always maintained that it is the joint responsibility of the Nigeria Football Association (NFA) and the Ministry of Sports to ensure the existence of an enabling environment for both the domestic game and the national team, allowing both to thrive and achieve their full potential. That it is the Cameroonians who are now showing the benefits of reasonably competent administration ought to be a pointer to anyone within both the Ministry of Sports and the NFA with a head on his shoulders that the time has come to get our act together. The days when it was said of our team "they succeeded in spite of poor administration" are still with us after so many years, but increasingly our players are finding success difficult to come by. The time for administrators to become visibly and consistently proactive enablers in the creation of this success has arrived.

It appears apposite to digress at this point and mention the recent plea by the NFA Secretary-General, Dr. Tijani Yusuf, for cooperation with the football house on the part of sections of the Nigerian public. The suggestion was that the general impression of the current NFA was negative. Be that as it may, it is sufficient to view Yusuf’s plea in the light of the Latin legal maxim “Res ipsa loquitur” [The thing speaks for itself]. Six years ago, Nigeria reached the zenith with the highest-ever FIFA official ranking of Number 5 in the world. Today, Nigeria has slipped to the lower reaches of the rankings, and lies within the forties region. One of the most difficult things for a self-respecting individual to do is to extend a hand of cooperation to a body that has been adjudged grossly incompetent by most rational organizational evaluation standards. That body and its functionaries must undergo a process of reorganization, recreation and reengineering which must not only be successful but also be seen to be successful.

Returning to the subject at hand, the Cameroonian approach now is somewhat reminiscent to the Nigerian approach under Clemens Westerhof. The higher profile of their opposition is what however draws attention thereto, whereas in Nigeria's case perhaps it has been easier for the not so discerning to overlook. The Eagles under Westerhof in his latter years were in 2 streams: the established Europe-based professionals, and the established local professionals with a sprinkling of neophyte Europe based professionals as well as those Europe-based professionals on the comeback trail. This latter combination destroyed Ethiopia 6-0 in a CAN qualifier in Lagos, with Peter Rufai making his return and Sunday Oliseh debuting.
While the former combination tended to handle the bigger World Cup matches, the latter combination prosecuted the CAN qualification campaigns.

Playing internationally had the salutary effect of exposing the established local professionals not only to the intricacies of international football, but also giving them the opportunity to showcase their ability to scouts. Finidi George is a notable beneficiary of the opportunities created by this type of arrangement. The coruscating Friday Ekpo was not as fortunate however [due largely to claims, legitimate or otherwise, that he was too slow ... but as the former Leeds United and England midfield general Tony Currie, also accused of being too slow, once said, "You can't play intelligent football at 100 mph".]

What our present situation calls for, in a nutshell, is a series of changes in Nigerian football that will affect all aspects of the game from the highest to the lowest echelons. These changes are summarized in a series of steps set out below.

THE CYBER EAGLES WAY FORWARD

In the enlightened, long-term interest of Nigerian football, the Ministry of Sports must be divested of power of control over the NFA that decree 101 donates to it. This naturally means outright abrogation of the decree, if not particular amendment. The legal effect of abrogating the Decree will be to end the Sports Ministry's actual control of the NFA. This control is exercised via the NFA secretary, who is a direct employee of the Sports Ministry and is the personage who wields actual executive power. He answers to the Permanent Secretary of the Sports Ministry and the Minister of Sports. He is not answerable to the NFA chairman, who is merely a figurehead. Thus the NFA Chairman is very conveniently placed for our poniards, whereas the functionary responsible for actual implementation is not.

The NFA chairman runs for that office on a platform of ideas, competes for votes to win and implement his ideas. He is however in an invidious position because the success of his tenure depends on a civil servant who does not answer to him but wields the actual power. This must change.

With these changes, will come a stoppage of annual fiscal flow from the coffers of the Federal Government, but football organization in Nigeria more than has the wherewithal to fend for itself comfortably with proper and visionary management.

In the enlightened interest of our football, the NFA must hold fresh elections. From all available indications, the reign of Dominic Oneya thus far has seen "business as usual", and the general opinion is one of sore dissatisfaction with the reaction to Jo Bonfrere's allegation that the reason behind the Eagles' inactivity in terms of exhibition matches and friendly internationals is a greedy official's demands for monetary "satisfaction".

The reconstituted NFA MUST as a matter of urgency conduct a needs assessment. What are the needs of the domestic game? What are the desiderata? Many things spring to mind. Improved pitch quality, better refereeing, better player management and remuneration, more effective revenue generation via hoard advertising, the sale of TV broadcast rights [terrestrial and satellite], club sponsorship via shirt advertising, establishment by clubs of proper corporate structures in line with their official status as Public or Private Limited Companies [plc] duly registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission; ownership of stadia by clubs or lease agreements between clubs and the owners of the stadiums. The list goes on.

Here in the USA, a market seems to exist for football programming from third world countries. Many subscribe to RAI, Football Chileano, Telemundo and a host of others which show football matches during the weekends. Starved as we are for information on the young up and coming stars of the Nigerian game, and considering the esteem with which Nigerian players are held outside that country, it seems that the prospect of TV revenue going to clubs, and ultimately players –thereby giving a healthy shot in the arm to the matter of players’ welfare—is hardly a chimera. With the hundreds of thousands of Nigerians resident in such cities as New York and Houston, a satellite television market is guaranteed.

Dish Network / WebTV for instance, is open to programming from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, India, Egypt and various others [unlike, for example Directv which caters to what it considers a more demographically mainstream market]. The revenue flowing to both the clubs and the NFA from a TV deal involving an octopus of the size of DishNetwork or WebTV will more than compensate for the loss of central government revenue. A market also exists in Europe, with the large Nigerian community resident in England. Nigerians in the Diaspora are ready, willing and able to support Nigerian football in a variety of ways, including TV viewership.

The immediate benefits are as follows:
clubs will become less strapped for cash.
that being so, they will be better able to remunerate their players handsomely.
consequently, players will be more comfortable.
this will contribute to reducing the stampede of our best players abroad before they are ready.
furthermore, the clubs which apply their income wisely will be able to build up their infrastructure.
the possibilities opened up by this kind of opportunity will encourage clubs to explore other revenue-earning methods.
in the long run, privately-owned clubs will be expected to become self-sufficient, while state-owned clubs will also earn a measure of financial independence from the various government agencies to which they are attached.
The NFA, working closely with the clubs, MUST institute a 10-year development plan. This 10-year plan must be based on the outcomes gleaned from item 3 above. Each plan must be broken down into manageable component parts, thus permitting step by step progress assessment, fine-tuning, etc.

As far as professionalism in the league and its organizing body is concerned, all employees of both the NFA and the clubs must mandatorily attend biennial management training courses organized by a reputable management training organization of the NFA and clubs' choice.
Clubs should be expected to send their coaches on training courses in the top European soccer schools. In this regard, advocating a Dutch school is indicated chiefly because whereas our style originally was inherited from the British, our natural tendency is not towards the British style and we have developed a style of our own distinct therefrom. It is nowhere near the Italian catennacio, or the French flow or even the Spanish style, and our players lean towards flair rather than Germanic method, Nordic simplicity or Eastern European orthodoxy. The Dutch system appears to encourage a fusion of varying styles, and the Dutch influence on our game has been strong of late.

The NFA must create a full time position of Technical Director. The occupant of this position will be the chief architect of the tactical and technical development of Nigerian football. He will be responsible for ensuring that clubs organize viable feeder systems, coaching and scouting systems for youths, thereby exposing players at a very early age to the tactical and technical intricacies of the game. [This is important because, as a BASIC example: tackling is not a matter of technique only but also tactics. Take a player committing to a sliding tackle against a balanced opponent when he is the last man with only the goalkeeper to beat [technique] versus a player who, in the same situation, holds off until help has arrived before launching into his tackle [tactics plus technique]. If our young players can learn these kind of things at an early age, their level of tactical awareness as they mature will be superior to today’s current stars].

In other words, the Technical Director will attempt to influence the development, not of the league in terms of the tactics and techniques which each individual team chose to adopt, but rather of the players that enter the league even before they become Pro League professionals. This is the role the current Liverpool manager Gerard Houllier played within the French Football Federation, and the results have been a World Cup and European Championship victories. Giving credit only to Aime Jacquet and Roger Lemerre is thus ignoring the importance of Houllier's quiet background work over several years. The tactical nous and technical adeptness of the Anelkas, Vieiras, Petits, Desaillys and a host of others can be traced to the sterling work of Gerard Houllier in laying a general foundation for French football.
Imagine the impact on our league! And subsequently, on our national team! Such a person might be Chief Adegboye Onigbinde.

The rule should be established that all national age-grade selections MUST emanate from within the Nigerian league, YSFON and the secondary schools games. This will be a way to keep in line with FIFA's proposal to ban the sale of any player under the age of 18 years to another country. In fact if the rule is applied to ALL age grade selections, this age restriction will be increased to 21 years minimum.

We must encourage our young players to establish themselves in Nigeria first before they go abroad, for these reasons:

The trade in our young players is bad for our National team and football development in Nigeria because it leads to problems with call ups, creates a superiority complex amongst some players thereby causing disharmony, creates problems in player development, and is a factor in players’ exploitation by unscrupulous agents and clubs.

In order to fulfil the mandate to organize the local scene before soccer glory returns to Nigeria, we must recognise the importance of ensuring that our players have good grounding in the Nigerian league in the same way that the Keshis, Amunikes, Amokachis, Rufais, Shorunmus, Yekinis, Siasias and a host of others did before venturing abroad in pursuit of professional careers. It is noteworthy that even though we had mostly Europe-based professionals in our 1994 squads to the CAN and World Cup, most already had a good grounding at home before going professional overseas. Consider the goalkeepers and the entire back line during the 1994 World Cup finals: while all of them played professional soccer abroad they had made their mark at home.

It is recommended that only the full squad may be the exception to that rule.

The NFA must take steps, as the body responsible for the OVERALL organization of the Nigerian game [and not just the league], schoolboy football inclusive, to resuscitate the Principals' Cup competitions. We have all noted that the Principals' Cup is a veritable hunting ground for the best schoolboys, whom will in turn, hardened by serious inter-school, inter-local government and inter-state football, populate and drive the clubs, with the upper strata thereof wearing Nigeria’s colors eventually.

The Principals’ Cup has had a long and illustrious history, and the benefits accruing therefrom to Nigerian soccer have been innumerable. The likes of Sam Okpodu, Tarila Okorowanta, the star players of the Nwosu-Keshi era at St. Finbarrs, almost the entire complement of the late Christopher Udemezue’s Flying Eagles of 1983, the preponderance of whom would go on to win full honors for Nigeria: these are products of the Principals’ Cup. This competition must be brought back to life.

Our current football governing authorities need to get with the program. The issue at hand is a visionary overhauling of the administration, the creation of an efficient organization which will stimulate the proper development and deployment of talent.

Additionally, all those calling for Johannes Bonfrere’s head must tarry a while and reevaluate our situation with a critical, emotionless eye. Since 1994 when Clemens Westerhof left Nigeria after the World Cup finals, we have had the following succeed him:
Shuaibu Amodu
Carlos Alberto Torres
Johannes Bonfrere
Philippe Troussier
Bora Milutinovic
Thijs Libregts
Johannes Bonfrere (again). This high turnover of Technical Advisers has been in the space of less than 6 calendar years.

It is not arguable at all that stability as a factor in progress and development in all fields of human endeavor is a sine qua non. Thus, if the aim in Nigeria is to restore Nigerian soccer to its former preeminence in the African and world game, then a continuation of the Technical Advisership merry-go-round is hardly indicated.

The complaints against Bonfrere have been well-documented in headlines and stories by such reputable papers as The Comet, The Guardian and The Vanguard, chief of which includes:
Bonfrere’s glaring lack of respect for his employers; and
Bonfrere’s unrepentant refusal to cast his eye on the domestic league for international quality talent.

It appears that Bonfrere’s attitude should not be condoned, because, in the first place, nowhere in the world do employees dictate to employers; and second